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Like many academic disciplines in the twenty first century the humanities have
been deeply affected by developments in the brain sciences. Conceptually this has
meant that some of the major preoccupations of the previous century, like those
adhering to a Cartesian division between mind and body or the psychoanalytical
conscious/unconscious duality, have been supplanted by a new kind of neurolo-
gical relation; that is to say, the relation established between a diminished mental
faculty  and  the  imperceptible  governing  power  of  the nonconscious.  What  is
presented here is focused on a theoretically contested notion of the neurological
nonconscious that has produced two differently orientated strands in the posthu-
manities. The discussion focuses on attempts to assimilate a contested understand-
ing of the nonconscious in a remodelled cognitive theoretical framework, on one
hand, and a new materialist rendering of affect theory, on the other.
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Al igual que muchas disciplinas académicas en el siglo XXI, las humanidades se
han visto profundamente afectadas por los avances en las ciencias  del cerebro.
Conceptualmente esto ha significado que algunas de las principales inquietudes
del pasado siglo, como las que se adhieren a una división cartesiana entre mente y
cuerpo, o la dualidad psicoanalítica del consciente/inconsciente, han sido suplan-
tadas por un nuevo tipo de relación neurológica; esto es, la relación establecida
entre una facultad mental disminuida y el imperceptible poder gobernante de lo
no-consciente. Lo que se presenta aquí se centra en una noción teóricamente im-
pugnada del no-consciente neurológico que ha producido dos posicionamientos
orientados de manera diferente en las posthumanidades. La discusión se centra en
los intentos  de  asimilar  una  comprensión  impugnada del  no-consciente  en un
marco teórico cognitivo remodelado, por un lado, y una nueva interpretación ma-
terialista de la teoría del afecto, por el otro.
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Introduction
Like many academic disciplines in the twenty first century the humanities have been
deeply affected by developments in the brain sciences. Conceptually this has meant
that some of the major preoccupations of the previous century, like those adhering to
a Cartesian division between mind and body or the psychoanalytical conscious/uncon-
scious duality, have been supplanted by a new kind of neurological relation; that is to
say, the relation established between a diminished mental faculty and the impercept-
ible governing power of the nonconscious. It is not the case, of course, that every hu-
manities scholar has blindly followed this trend, but the inclination toward posthu-
manism, for example,  has certainly been shored up by a prevailing notion of con-
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sciousness grasped as just the tip of an iceberg of underlying, insensible neurological
processes. The once radical idea that consciousness, formerly modelled via cognitive
processes like attention, perception and memory, was just a thin slice of the action has
now become a mainstream concept that infiltrates major debates. The nonconscious
poses many questions for decades of cognitive work in the humanities and dramatic-
ally shifts the research focus away from an anthropocentric weltanschauung toward
nonhuman worlds. Indeed, the concept now figures writ large in wide ranging debates
on, for example, visual communication (Williams and Newton, 2009), digital technolo-
gies (Grusin, 2010) and the Anthropocene (e.g. Hayles, 2017, p. 34).
Significantly, the nonconscious also maps on to a more general and influential
turn to affect, emotions and feelings that initially became prominent in the brain sci-
ences in the early 1990s (e.g. Damasio, 1995). This turn has, as such, challenged schol-
ars who are critical of the ways in which neuroscience has been seized upon in the hu-
manities (and social theory), prompting them to re-evaluate the role of the noncon-
scious in the study of, for example, discourse and ideology; (Leys, 2011, Wetherell,
2012); concepts which have traditionally had a distinctive cognitive slant. Others have
taken a more balanced viewpoint seeing little difference between a neurobiological
materialism and critique (Pitts-Taylor, 2016, Sampson, 2016). The nonconscious has in-
deed become a deep seated component  of  the politics within the humanities amid
wider  concerns about  the precariousness  of  human cognition in technical  systems
(Thrift, 2004; Hayles, 2017, pp. 173-75). To be sure, techno-capitalism itself cannot be
considered today without a contemplation of the cognitive and affective politics it sug-
gests (Karpi, Kahkonen and Mannevuo, 2016).
Due to the complexity of this disciplinary drama, the aims of this condensed art-
icle remain fairly modest. What is presented here is focused on a theoretically con-
tested notion of the neurological nonconscious that has produced two differently ori-
entated strands in the posthumanities. Indeed, before addressing this theoretical divi-
sion of the neuro-inspired nonconscious, it is significant to note that there is more in-
stability than consensus in the neurosciences. The popular error of labelling the multi-
plicity of brain sciences a singular “neuroscience” has been acknowledged, as such, in
the plurality of neuroculture (Rolls, 2012; Sampson, 2016). Nonetheless, this discussion
focuses on attempts to assimilate a contested understanding of the nonconscious in a
remodelled cognitive theoretical framework, on one hand, and a new materialist ren-
dering of affect theory, on the other. In the case of new materialism, it is perhaps sens-
ible  to  also  concede that  there  is,  from the outset,  “no stable  definition of  affect”
(Thrift, 2007, p. 175). In Melissa Gregg and Greg Seigworth’s (2010) key text, The Affect
Theory Reader,  there  is  a purposefully  incomplete  list  of  eight  different  theoretical
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angles to affect theory (pp. 6-8). Here I will simply refer to new materialism as just one
way to capture a particular kind of affect theory that embraces the nonconscious to
challenge certain assumptions in cognitive science.1 Although similarly influenced by
the neurological nonconscious, through its broadening out the cognitive theoretical
frame, the former strand provides a number of challenges to the ontological (and ideo-
logical) commitments of new materialism (Hayles, 2017, pp. 65-85).
What follows is structured around three brief explorations of each strand. First,
the article explores the differing ways in which the neuroscientific nonconscious has
stirred up the posthumanities. As said, the enquiry is restricted in scope, but aims to
expose some level  of  generality by placing a small  range of  new materialist  work
alongside  Katherine  N.  Hayles’s  recent  concept  of  the  cognitive  nonconscious  ex-
pressed in her 2017 book, Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious. Second,
the article asks if new materialism, as Hayles claims, conspicuously ignores conscious
cognition or does it offer a more nuanced concept, which, as I will argue here, moves
beyond the cognitive framework to grasp a different kind of thought. Third, and re-
latedly, the article assesses the value of using a remodelled cognitive framework to
understand the materiality of relations suggested by the nonconscious. Herein, con-
trasting conceptual understandings of matter, information, affect, levels, forces and as-
semblage become the focus. Finally, the piece concludes by cursorily assessing some of
the key differences between each strand and making a few observations intended for
future debate.
The Rise of Neuroscientific Nonconscious and the 
Humanities
In order to trace  the widespread influence of  the neuroscientific nonconscious  we
need look no further than the impact of Antonio Damasio’s (1995) somatic marker
thesis. To be sure, along with Benjamin Libet (1985) and Joseph LeDoux (2003), Dama-
sio’s Spinoza-inspired notion of the enhanced and enmeshed role somatically derived
affects play in the processes behind reasoning and decision making figures writ large
in these two diverging strands of interpretation.
To begin with, Damasio’s work is often cited as support for a principal idea in
new materialism; that is, despite the humanities’ orthodox fixation with an anthropo-
centric worldview, humans actually arrive “late to consciousness” (Thrift, 2007, p. 186).
In other words, the human brain is understood to take its time to build consciousness
1 I have to declare at this point that most of my work to date has focused on a broadly understood new materialist
approach and affect theory (e.g. Sampson, 2012, 2016, 2020).
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as just  one of  many responses to the dynamics of  external  environmental  stimuli.
Drawing on Spinoza, Wilhelm Wundt, as well as Libet, Damasio thus enables new ma-
terialism to frame the immediate experience of consciousness as a radical “backdated
illusion” (p. 131). Indeed, thinking is not at all limited to the thought inside the brain,
but as Thrift argues, Damasio provides an understanding of how somatic markers act
as a kind of “corporeal thinking” in affect theory (p. 187). Through Damasio’s work we
further  see  how  the  forces of  affect  traverse  and  remap  emotions  (Bertelsen  and
Murphie, 2010, p. 140). Emotion, in this context, is a kind of capture of affect in con-
sciousness, but the focus is distinctly less on how these maps relate to conventional
cognitive processes than it is on the significance of a feely, bodily  precognition.  As
Thrift (2007) contends:
We should […] pay more attention to the precognitive. This roiling mass of
nerve volleys prepare the body for action in such a way that intentions or
decisions are made before the conscious self is even aware of them. (p. 7)
There is a distinctive nonhuman concept applied to technology in the new materi-
alist’s  rendering of  the  affective  nonconscious.  For  example,  similarly  drawing on
Damasio and LeDoux, Richard Grusin (2010) offers a theory of affect in relation to the
premediated human encounters with digital media, following, in part, a neuropsycho-
logy approach that insists upon: “The inseparability of cognition from affect or emo-
tion, often on the priority of affect and emotion to cognition and rational judgment”
(p. 78).
Grusin borrows from Hayles’ (2006) modification of Thrift’s (2004) “technological
unconscious” transforming it into the neurologically fine-tuned concept of the “tech-
nological nonconscious” (Grusin, 2010, p. 72).
The nonconscious relation between human and nonhuman worlds of inorganic
matter also becomes key to the Deleuze-Spinozan vitalisms of new materialism, by
way of “linking the movements of matter with a processual incorporeality” (Gregg and
Seigworth, 2010, p. 6). Affect thus becomes the “hinge where mutable matter and won-
der… perpetually tumble into each other” (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010, p. 8). In other
words, affect does not just pass from human body to human body, but becomes a non-
conscious force of encounter with a dynamic materiality that possesses an autonomous
nonhuman capacity to act and be acted on.
It is important to initially note that Hayles’ (2017) concept of the “cognitive non-
conscious” is also influenced by Libet’s notion of a belated consciousness (p. 44). How-
ever, it is Damasio’s protoself that provides the core model of how the nonconscious
feeds forward to consciousness; that is to say, how it “operates at a level of neuronal
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processing inaccessible to the modes of awareness, but nevertheless perform[s] func-
tions essential to consciousness” (p. 10). Indeed, in this model neuronal processes level
up from Damasio’s primary protoself to higher levels of a core consciousness (pp. 9-
10). At the lower level there is a “kind of sensory or nonverbal narrative,” which integ-
rates Damasio’s somatic markers into coherent representations of the body, before be-
coming “melded with verbal content in higher consciousness” endowed with “abund-
ant memory, language, and reasoning, narratives” (p. 10). So, at the top of the stack of
cognitive levels is a distinctly human sense of higher consciousness “enriched” by the
production of a “well-defined protagonist, the autobiographical self” and “reinforced
through the verbal monologue that plays in our heads as we go about our daily busi-
ness” (pp. 9-10). It is these verbal narratives,  represented in the mental faculty of the
brain that helps humans make sense of who they are.
Significantly  though,  Hayles  reminds the reader  that  this  levelling up process
from proto to autobiographical self is not restricted to humans, but can be shared by
some nonhumans including “many mammals, and some aquatic species such as oc-
topi” (p. 9). To be sure, the novelty of Hayles’ concept is found in the expansion it of-
fers of this cognitive levelling up process to other broadly defined cognizers who pos-
sess analogous interpretational and decision-making capacities. Although the starting
point is strictly a neurological model, these capacities are not restricted to animals
with brains, but include other biological cognizers, “including those lacking central
nervous systems, such as plants and microorganisms” (p. 15). Moreover, the noncon-
scious is further extended to the cognitive capabilities of specific technical systems,
some of which are inclusive of cognitive assemblages that bring together humans and
technologies via interactions with neuron networks in the brain. This use of the term
assemblage is important to Hayles given that it enables the humanities to break out of
the “anthropocentric view of cognition” enabling “bridges” that span “across different
phyla to construct a comparative view of cognition” (p. 15).
In spite of these efforts at bridge building, Hayles assemblage theory purposely
opens up a stark categorical divide between cognitive and noncognitive worlds (pp.
30-33). On one hand, there are the cognizers; human and nonhuman actors, including
some biological forms and computer algorithms, with the cognitive capacity to choose,
decide and interpret. On the other, there are noncognizers, including inanimate and in-
organic materials,  such as stones  and hurricanes,  which may well  be  agents  “har-
nessed to perform cognitive tasks” (p. 32), but are nonetheless noncognitive since they
lack cognitive capacities. This categorical divide has a distinct intention. Significantly,
the point is not to…
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Ignore the achievements of conscious thought,  often seen as the defining
characteristic of humans, [but to] overcome the (mis)perception that humans
are the only important or relevant cognizers on the planet. (pp. 10-11)
As Hayles contends, once this “misperception” is overcome then the humanities
can turn to new important questions and ethical considerations (pp. 10-11). Indeed,
whereas the technical cognitions found in AI algorithms, for example, have been com-
monly,  and  perhaps  misleadingly,  compared  with  higher  level  human  cognition,
Hayles contends that their traits are more analogous to a cognitive unconscious. As
she puts it:
Like human nonconscious cognition, technical cognition processes informa-
tion faster than consciousness, discerns patterns and draws inferences and,
for state-aware systems, processes inputs from subsystems that give inform-
ation on the system’s condition and functioning. Moreover, technical cogni-
tions  are  designed  specifically  to  keep  human  consciousness  from  being
overwhelmed by massive informational streams so large, complex, and mul-
tifaceted that they could never be processed by human brains. (p. 11)
A major concern of Hayles’ work in the humanities is therefore centred on the in-
creasing disappearance of human cognitive consciousness from technical processes.
This article will persist in probing these two alternative kinds of approaches to
the nonconscious. But for now, some cursory comparisons and contrasts need to be
made. Notably, both approaches readily align themselves to neuroscientific notions of
the nonconscious and expand this notion to nonhuman worlds.  However,  whereas
new materialism expands the capacity of affect to an inclusive human and nonhuman
world of agential organic and inorganic matter, the cognitive nonconscious makes a
categorical distinction between selected cognizant actors and noncognizant agents de-
pendent on their capacity to choose, decide and interpret.
Where is Consciousness?
Hayles’ (2017) formulation of the cognitive unconscious is based, in part, on a critique
of new materialism (chapter three). It is worth noting that this critique begins with
some affirmative observations. For example, the new materialist’s effort to decentre
the human subject is noted as a welcome move against “human exceptionalism” in the
humanities, which, she contends, has overly focused on a “privileged special category”
imbued with language, rationality, and higher consciousness, to the detriment of the
human’s  “continuum with nonhuman life  and material  processes” (p.  65).  Further-
more, Hayles seems to particularly admire the strong ontological commitment new
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materialism has to a conceptual foregrounding of a materiality that is vibrant rather
than passive, and exists in metastable, dynamic processes, and assemblages with trans-
formative potentials. Hayles continues:
After  the  baroque  intricacies  of  the  linguistic  turn,  [new materialist]  ap-
proaches arrive like bursts of oxygen to a fatigued brain. Focusing on the
grittiness of actual material processes, they introduce materiality, along with
its complex interactions, into humanities discourses that for too long and too
often have been oblivious to the fact that all higher consciousness and lin-
guistic acts, no matter how sophisticated and abstract, must in the first in-
stance emerge from underlying material processes. (p. 65)
This initial enthusiasm is, however, a brief concealment of a hefty ontological dis-
agreement concerning the ways in which new materialism frames the nonconscious.
The main thrust of Hayles’ criticism is what she sees as the conspicuous absence of
“consciousness and cognition” (pp. 65-66). Perhaps this is because of a reluctance, she
suggests, on behalf of new materialists to “slip [back] into received ideas and lose the
radical edge that the focus on materiality provides” (p. 66). Nonetheless, Hayles con-
tends that by separating materiality from cognition new materialism weakens the case
for a new materiality since it “erases the critical role played by materiality in creating
the structures and organizations from which consciousness and cognition emerge” (p.
66). This is indeed a gritty provocation and one that new materialism should respond
to in full. However, for now this discussion will simply ask if consciousness is erro-
neously or purposely missing from new materialism, or is there a more nuanced un-
derstanding of how nonconscious affect relates to consciousness.
At  the outset,  if  we again peruse Gregg and Seigworth’s  (2010) Affect  Theory
Reader we can see how Hayles’ suspicions have most probably been fuelled by what
appears to be the celebratory zeal of some authors who see the role of the noncon-
scious in one of affects theory’s main achievements; that is to say, “affect's displace-
ment of the centrality of cognition” (p. 5). To be sure, affect theorists have enthusiast-
ically drawn on various neurological conditions like synaesthesia to destabilize the
study of discrete “cognitive modes” in preference for “sensual interconnection” (High-
more, 2010, pp. 119-20). Moreover, Brian Massumi’s influential focus on affective in-
tensities are posited in such a way as to “transform”, “translate” or even go “beyond”
cognition (Bertelsen and Murphie, 2010. p. 147). Similarly, Anna Gibbs (2010) argues
that affect “prompts a rethinking of just what is meant by cognition at all” (p. 200).
After affect theory, Gibbs argues, there can be no “pure cognition… uncontaminated
by the richness of sensate experience, including affective experience” (p. 200).
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However, these attempts to weaken cognition do not entirely ignore emergent
consciousness. Hayles observation of its conspicuous absence from new materialism
has been, it would appear, somewhat selective. Indeed, through its embracing of the
nonconscious, new materialism has arguably developed a far more nuanced under-
standing of cognition. As Megan Watkins (2010) points out, although nonconscious
affects operate “independently, accumulating as bodily memory,” and “may evade con-
sciousness altogether,” they also aid cognition and induce behaviour (p. 279). Indeed,
this bodily memory—related in so many ways to Damasio’s somatic marker hypo-
thesis—does not become separated from cognition, but purposefully weakens the grip
of the cognitive frame on what it means to think. As Gregg and Seigworth (2010) ar -
gue:
In practice,  then, affect and cognition are never fully separable—if  for no
other reason than that thought is itself a body, embodied. (pp. 2-3)
Other affect theorists do not entirely disregard cognition either, but see it as the
“end product;” that is to say, the point at which the intensity of nonconscious affect
arrives as a “conscious emotion in the mind” (Probyn, 2010, p. 77). Along similar lines,
Massumi (cited in Thrift,  2007)  grasps cognition in the sense that it  completes the
“capture and closure of affect” (p. 180). The key difference here is that rather than see-
ing higher order cognitive processes, like perception, attention and memory, as the
end product of a levelling up process, affect theory favours a kind of emotional cogni-
tion as the most intensive expression of this capture. Others, like Lara (2018), explore
both the “restrictive capacities of consciousness” and the “influence” consciousness
has on environmental conditions assumed to affect a person (p. 39).
This repositioning of cognition also presents contrasting alternatives to the im-
portant ethical considerations Hayles draws attention to. For example, her concerns
over the potential disappearance of human consciousness from intelligent technical
systems draws on Thrift’s (2004) technological unconscious as the basis of a model of
automated cognition that  bends “bodies  with environments  to  a  specific set  of  ad-
dresses without the benefit of any cognitive inputs” (p. 177). On one hand then, Hayles
(2017) uses Thrift’s idea to argue for an expanded cognitive framework focused on
“meaning and interpretations,” which would operate like a bridge between the “tradi-
tional  humanities  and  the  kinds  of  nonconscious  cognitions”  performed by  AI  al-
gorithms (p. 176). Such a bridge would bring together the technical cognitive noncon-
scious of the algorithm and “those humans who design and implement them” (p. 176).
Clearly, there is much to be commended in Hayles’ desire to make the humanities pos-
ition on technology more immediate and less aloof. But arguably, on the other hand,
Thrift’s technological unconscious presents a more complex account of the role con-
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sciousness plays in technological systems. It is not simply the case that human cogni-
tion has been cut of the operations of these technical cognizers. On the contrary, it is
more a case of a wider capture of thinking that feeds on the precarious weaknesses of a
human consciousness subjected to techno-capitalism. As Thrift (2007) argues:
Consciousness can be depicted as though it hardly existed, as an emergent
derivative of an unconscious. Yet it is clearly dangerous to make too little of
cognition, as I perhaps did in some of my early papers. Because it is so weak
(though hardly as weak as some commentators have depicted it), it has en-
rolled powerful allies which can focus and extend conscious awareness –
various configurations of bodies and things which, knitted together as rou-
tinized  environments,  enable  a  range  of  different  technologies  for  more
thinking to be constructed. (pp. 6-7)
It is as a consequence of this capture of thinking that Thrift argues that we need to
“pay more attention to the precognitive” (p. 7). This is not, then, a technological non-
conscious that merely usurps the human cognizer. Indeed, it has been argued recently
that human emotion can, for example, become deeply interwoven with automated fin-
ancial algorithms (Borch and Lange, 2017). On the contrary, the technological noncon-
scious is a system that taps into precognitive affects in order to steer intentions before
the autobiographical self has a chance to even become aware that decisions have been
made.
On Matter: Information, Assemblages and Contagion
Hayles (2017) begins her thesis by relocating cognition outside of the cybernetic model
of consciousness and rejecting the legacy of cybernetics in “the computation of the
cognitivists” (p. 12). Here again we can grasp the influence of the neurosciences on the
cognitive frame as it too moves away from the overly exhausted computer/brain meta-
phor towards a new paradigm that encompasses the nonconscious. Following this lo-
gic Hayles remarks that there is a growing recognition in the neurosciences that neur-
onal processes are not “fundamentally computational” (p. 13). Indeed, there is increas-
ing support for an embodied and biologically constituted kind of cognition that is not
simply restricted to an image of cognizant human thought (i.e. aware, attentive etc.).
This leads to an acknowledgement of the differing contexts in which cognitive pro-
cesses are assumed to emerge. The cognitive frame therefore expands to include dis-
tributed nonconscious neuronal communications between humans, like those estab-
lished  via  circuits  of  so-called  mirror  neurons  (p.  48).  More  profoundly  perhaps,
Hayles notes how these embodied contexts can be extended to include some nonhu-
mans; plants, for example (pp. 16-20). Indeed, it is this concept of cognition as “a broad
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compass” that leads her to further incorporate technical contexts into the category of
cognizers (pp. 20-25).
Evidently,  this  neurologically-inspired appeal  to  broader  contexts  of  cognition
points to some fundamental collisions with new materialism. Particular attention is
drawn here, as such, to Hayles provocative use of the term assemblage to explain how
these  broader  contexts  of  the  cognitive  nonconscious  are  distributed  exclusively
through networks of cognizers (chapter five). To begin with, although Hayles claims
to manoeuvre away from computational metaphors towards an embodied model of
cognition,  her  concept  of  cognitive  assemblages  retains  many of  the  conventional
metaphorical  references  to  engineering  terms  to  support  the  categorical  division
between cognizers and noncognizers. Most notably, the cognizer/noncognizer categor-
ization is dependent on the role of flows of information and information processing (pp.
115-16). As follows, the cognizer actor is made distinct from the material agency of the
noncognizer since the former can act on information received while the latter can only
be harnessed as an agent of information flow (pp. 28-29).
Moreover,  albeit  recognizing  that  information  is  context-dependent  (p.  22),
Hayles remodelled cognitive framework is, on one hand, determined by fairly conven-
tional computational operations, such as the levelling up from “layers of interactions
from low-level choices, and consequently very simple cognitions, to higher cognitions
and interpretations” (p. 13), and on the other, a noncognitive material world defined
by a lack of such operations; that is to say, the noncognizer is an agent that cannot
process information in order to, for example, decide. For example, a “tsunami,” Hayles
notes, “cannot choose to crash against a cliff rather than a crowded beach” (p. 3). In
other words, although human decisions, climate change, the self-organising forces of
matter that constitute a storm and human death are interconnected, the middle two
are only regarded as a passive part of an informational loop, defined, in effect, by a
lack of information processing power.
Ultimately, Hayles presents a differently orientated materialism, claiming that the
cognitive nonconscious is all about “matter, energy, and  information, [and] not only
matter in the narrow sense” (p. 218 italics added). Therefore, the categorical border
line between cognizers and noncognizers only includes plants and technical systems
since they “share certain structural and functional similarities” with a model of human
cognition defined by a capacity to act on the “flow[s] of information through a system
and the choices and decisions that create, modify, and interpret the flow” (p. 116). This
ensures that material agents and forces outside of these structures must take a back-
seat to the “cognizers within the assemblage that enlist these affordances and direct
their powers to act in complex situations” (p. 116).
10
Tony D. Sampson
There are a few frothy comparisons that can be made between certain aspects of
Hayles’ cognitive assemblages and new materialist affect theory. For example, the fo-
cus on mirror neurons in Hayles’ account is fairly reminiscent of Gibbs (2010) work on
the processes of affective mimicry in which she argues that the “sharing of form com-
prises information in the pre-cybernetic sense” (pp. 193-94). Affective mimicry or con-
tagion, like, to some extent, the mirroring neuron circuitry of embodied cognition, be-
comes an “action on bodies” that in some way goes on to not only affect body chem-
istry, but also affects attitudes and ideas (p. 194). As Thrift (2007) similarly argues, af -
fective contagion reveals that there is “only a delicate separation between one’s own
mental life and that of another” (p. 237). Nonetheless, the information flows that pass
through Hayles’ (2017) imitative cognitive assemblages are in sharp contrast to the as-
semblages of affective contagion. On one hand, cognitive assemblages are connected
by  a  series  of  metaphorical  “channels”  through  which  information  is  interpreted.
These channels begin with a lower level “signal-response” system like those assumed
to function in mirror neurons, for example, but have since evolved into a higher level
linguistic channel (p. 128). In other words, these channels form information loops or
“network hardware” through which mimicry travels on its way from lower level social
signals to higher level verbal codes (p. 128). As follows, we find a “trajectory analog-
ous to nonconscious cognition developing first, with consciousness emerging later and
being built on top” (p. 128). On the other hand, according to Thrift (2007), affective
contagion  is  considered  as  a  mixture  of  occurrences  produced  in  an  encounter
between bodies  and events  outside  the  cognitive  frame,  including “hormonal  flux,
body language, shared rhythms, and other forms of entrainment” (p. 236).
Affective contagions are experienced as semiconscious flows of sensation “mov-
ing through the bodies of human and other beings” rather than information flows in
the “thin band of consciousness we now call cognition” (p. 236). Indeed, these broadly
understood bodies are like “receivers and transmitters” in the sense that they perpetu-
ally move messages on, but bodies not restricted to information flows; they are also
receivers and transmitters of feelings and affects as well as attentive energy (p. 236).
Indeed, a child who mimics an aeroplane, for example, does more than simply make a
cognitive  choice to imitate. The child is  exposed to an affective  force of  encounter,
which not only affects the child’s desire to imitate, but passes on a transformative feel-
ing to other parts of the assemblage. Unlike the context dependent nature of cognitive
assemblages then, connected by embedded informational channels, affect is independ-
ent of context. The force of affective encounter is transposed, as such, across contexts.
Probably the most marked differences between cognitive and new materialist as-
semblages is in effect noted by Hayles (2017). Indeed, whereas she sees Deleuze and
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Guattari’s assemblage theory leaning on “connotations of connection,  event,  trans-
formation, and becoming” and favouring “desire, affect, and transversal energies over
cognition,” the cognitive assemblage aims to offer a broader definition that includes a
“provisional collection of parts” that are in a…
Constant flux as some are added and others lost. The parts are not so tightly
bound that transformations are inhibited and not so loosely connected that
information cannot flow between parts. (pp. 117-18)
As Hayles puts it, the most “important connotation” of cognitive assemblages is
the…
Implication that arrangements can scale up, progressing from very low-level
choices into higher levels of cognition and consequently decisions affecting
larger areas of concern. (p. 118)
There is, then, an important distinction that needs to be made between the level-
ling up of cognitive assemblages and the force of encounter in new materialism. In the
case of the latter, Hayles points to examples of what she regards as careless new ma-
terialist accounts of forces that are supposed to work transversally across micro and
macrolevels. The issue is, she argues, that forces operate differently at certain levels,
and therefore need to be approached with more careful consideration of mechanism
specifics. The microlevels of bacterial life or quantum physics, for example, have very
different kinds of forces in operation, she claims, to those that might occur on a macro
socio-political or cultural level.
Hayles criticism of the forces of new materialism hinges on what she calls the re-
strictive ideological leanings toward “Deleuzian deterritorializations” (p. 73). However,
this line of argument, focused as it is entirely on deterritorializations, perhaps misses
the complex relations expressed in assemblage theory. Indeed, with every potential
deterritorializing line of flight there is the possibility of a territorial refrain or new ter-
ritorialization or reterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 310-50). This is
not to be misunderstood as a material relation in the narrow sense: The force of one
object exerting a force on another object. Neither is it complete chaos, but rather it
concerns complex  compositional  planes  in  which  different  kinds of  forces  are  ex-
pressed, including those found in far-from-equilibrium systems and systems at equilib-
rium, as well as chaotic and closed deterministic systems.
Further limitations become apparent in cognitive assemblage theory’s initial com-
mitment to Damasio’s levelling up process from proto to core self. This is because the
theory presents a neurocentric model of emergence that ultimately informs the sub-
sequent ways in which cognition is distributed to a select group of biological and non-
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biological contexts (the nonhuman cognizers). To be sure, what is lost in Damasio’s
model is an understanding of how these exterior, distributed relationalities operate
beyond the closed interiority of neuronal interactions. As follows, Damasio (2000), like
LeDoux (2003), contends that the coherent sense of self individual humans experience
at the higher level of cognition is an emergent outcome of nonconscious interactions
located inside the microlevel of synaptic functionality. This is not to say that the emer-
gence of the self that says “I” is produced by a brain that is entirely immune to implicit
affective somatic experiences. Nor is it a self wholly composed of purely explicit cog-
nitive functions (perceptions, attention, memory, etc.). On the contrary, the core self
emerges from nonconscious experiences  of  the  material  world in the wider sense.
However, unlike new materialism, which focuses on nonrepresentational and precog-
nitive tendencies of affect, the guiding principal of the protoself takes the form of a
series of hardwired representations of the organism itself located  inside the brain at
various levels. It is these bodily representations that are supposed to maintain the co-
herence of self. This is what Damasio (2000) considers to be the most likely “biological
forerunner” of the sense of a “preconscious biological precedent” (p. 21). It is the vari-
ous neuronal interactions between the levels of protoself and autobiographical self
that  produce more elaborate  representations  experienced at  a higher  level  of  con-
sciousness as identity and personhood.  The sense of self  therefore emerges matry-
oshka-like through a levelling up of representations that are interpreted at the higher
level of consciousness.
Similar to Hayles, then, Damasio’s model also seemingly breaks away from the
old cybernetic models of consciousness, but there is a familiar and problematic reten-
tion of the metaphorical concepts of information processing and representational stor-
age inherited from cybernetics (Sampson, 2016, pp. 126-29). Nonetheless, Hayles (2017)
argues that the process of levelling up is crucial to the framework of nonconscious
cognition. She concludes:
The specific dynamics operating at different levels provide a way to distin-
guish between material processes and nonconscious cognition as an emer-
gent result, as well as elucidating the modes of organization characteristic of
consciousness/unconsciousness. (p. 69)
Conclusion
The focus of this short article has been on a theoretically contested neurological no-
tion of the nonconscious that has influenced two differently orientated strands in the
posthumanities. On one hand, the new materialists and their brand of affect theory
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have, for most part, welcomed a neurologically defined nonconscious as support for
the principal idea that the cognitive conscious is a late arriver, and as a result, much
weaker than the anthropocentric humanities had assumed. Indeed, the focus is less on
the emergence of consciousness than it is on alternative concepts of bodily  thought,
mind controlling precognition and vulnerabilities to affective contagion. More import-
antly perhaps, and despite drawing on the neuroscientific nonconscious, new materi-
alism remains  committed to  inclusive  assemblages  of  sense  making that  bring to-
gether,  for  example,  neurons and the self-organising matter of  a storm, without  a
brain. This is a flat ontology that does not preconceive of the ascendency of bifurcated
human consciousness, but rather looks to transformations that arise through the hu-
man and nonhuman meso-levels of material relations. As follows, new materialist the-
oretical understandings of nonconscious assemblages foreground the importance of
relations of exteriority.
On the  other  hand,  Hayles  neurologically-inspired  expansion of  the  cognitive
frame beyond the human brain claims to get a little closer to the new materialist’s as-
semblage theory (p. 117). However, as well as criticising its lack of attention to emer-
gent consciousness, Hayles also decries new materialisms overreliance on encounters
with ill-defined physical forces and for overlooking the detail  of  specific level pro-
cesses through which cognition is assumed to emerge. Perhaps these are legitimate
criticisms,  particularly  if  one  agrees  with  Hayles’  assessment  that  the  excesses  of
Deleuzian terminology can obfuscate  the detail  of  concrete  examples  of  force  and
shroud them in ideological assumptions rather than empirical knowledge (p. 79). In
many ways though, Hayles has simply replaced the anthropocentric structures of the
humanities  with a  neurocentric  posthumanities.  The ontology of  Hayles’  cognitive
frame thus begins in the microscales of the material brain before it emerges as a dis-
tributed  macroscale  consciousness.  This  neurocentric  model  of  emergence  is  con-
sequently analogically related to broader contexts of neuron-like tendencies in plants
and some technical systems. This is a levelling up of a metaphorical brain understood
as mostly determined by relations of interiority; that is to say, these level-interaction
neurocorrelates  established  between  micro-neuronal  transmissions  and  their  sub-
sequent journey to macro mental  faculties  come to define the entire  cognitive as-
semblage.
Arguably, the entire basis of Hayles’ tripartite diagram of the (human) cognitive
frame (p.  40)  begins from the starting point of the neurological  cognitive noncon-
sciousness and works backwards to explain everything that comes before and after. To
be sure, this diagram positions modes of awareness and material processes on either
side of the cognitive nonconscious,  but the emergent relations that might connect
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matter and consciousness are limited by way of a commitment to flows of information
and information processing. Finally, the levelling up of cognitive processes between
micro and macroscales is perhaps as nebulous as the forces of new materialism, but it
also  discriminates  between  those  things  with  cognitive  powers  and  those  things
without. Given Hayles’ own concern for the Anthropocene and the new “reality that
human actions are unleashing forces far beyond our ability to control them” (p. 83),
then it would seem that an alternative ethical response might be to embrace the forces
of this noncognitive world and see them as part of more inclusive sense making as-
semblage.
References 
Bertelsen, Lone & Murphie, Andrew. (2010). An ethics of everyday infinities and 
powers: Felix Guattari on affect and the refrain. In Melissa Gregg & Greg. J. 
Seigworth (Eds.), The affective theory reader (pp. 138-160). Durham & London: 
Duke University Press.
Borch, Christian. & Lange, Ann-Christina (2017). High-frequency trader subjectivity: 
emotional attachment and discipline in an era of algorithms. Socio-Economic 
Review, 15(2), 283-306. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mww013 
Damasio, Antonio (1995) Descartes’ error: emotion, reason, and the human brain. New 
York: Penguin.
Damasio, Antonio (2000). The feeling of what happens: body, emotion, and the making 
of consciousness. London: Vintage.
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Felix (1987). A thousand plateaus: capitalism and 
schizophrenia. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.
Gibbs, Anna (2010). After affect sympathy, Synchrony, and mimetic communication. 
Melissa Gregg & Greg. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The affective theory reader (pp. 186-
205). Durham & London: Duke University Press.
Gregg, Melissa. & Seigworth, Greg. J. (Eds.) (2010). The affective theory reader. Durham 
& London: Duke University Press.
Grusin, Richard (2010). Premediation: affect and mediality after 9/11. New York, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hayles, Katherine N (2006). Traumas in code. Critical Inquiry, 33(1), 136-157. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/509749 
Hayles, Katherine N (2017). Unthought: the power of the cognitive nonconscious. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Highmore, Ben (2010). Bitter after taste: affect, food, and social aesthetics. Melissa 
Gregg & Greg. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The affective theory reader (pp. 118-137). 
Durham & London: Duke University Press.
Karppi, Tero; Kahkonen, Lotta & Mannevuo, Mona. (Eds.) (2016) Affective capitalism. 
Ephemera, 16(4), 1-13.
15
Affect, Cognition and the Neurosciences
Lara, Ali. (2018). Craving assemblages: consciousness and chocolate desire. Capacious: 
Journal for Emerging Affect Inquiry, 1(2). 38-57.
LeDoux, Joseph (2003). The synaptic self: how our brains become who we are. New York: 
Penguin Books.
Leys, Ruth (2011). The turn to affect: a critique. Critical Inquiry, 37(3), 434-472. https://
doi.org/10.1086/659353
Libet, Benjamin (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will 
in voluntary action. Behavioral Brain Sciences, 8(5), 29-566. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00044903 
Pitts-Taylor, Victoria (2016). The Brain’s body: neuroscience and corporeal politics. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Probyn, Elspeth (2010). Writing shame. Melissa Gregg & Greg. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The 
affective theory reader (pp. 71-92). Durham & London: Duke University Press.
Rolls, E. T. (2012) Neuroculture: on the implications of brain science. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Sampson, Tony. D. (2012). Virality: contagion theory in the age of networks. Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Sampson, Tony. D. (2016). The Assemblage brain: sense making in neuroculture. 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Sampson, Tony. D. (2020). A sleepwalker’s guide to social Media. Cambridge: Polity.
Thrift, Nigel (2004). Remembering the technological unconscious by foregrounding 
knowledges of position. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 22(1),
175-190. https://doi.org/10.1068/d321t 
Thrift, Nigel (2007). Non-Representational theory: space, politics, affect. New York, 
London: Routledge.
Watkins, Megan (2010). Desiring recognition, accumulating affect. Melissa Gregg & 
Greg. J. Seigworth (Eds.), The affective theory reader (pp. 269-288). Durham & 
London: Duke University Press.
Wetherell, Margaret (2012). Affect and emotion: a new social science understanding. 
London: Sage.
Williams, Rick & Newton, Julianne (2009) Visual communication: integrating media, 
art, and science. New York, London: Routledge.
16
Este texto está protegido por una licencia Creative Commons   4.0 .
Usted es libre para Compartir —copiar y redistribuir el material en cualquier medio o formato— y Adaptar el documen-
to —remezclar, transformar y crear a partir del material— para cualquier propósito, incluso comercialmente, siempre
que cumpla la condición de: 
Atribución: Usted debe reconocer el crédito de una obra de manera adecuada, proporcionar un enlace a la licencia, e in-
dicar si se han realizado cambios . Puede hacerlo en cualquier forma razonable, pero no de forma tal que sugiera que tie-
ne el apoyo del licenciante o lo recibe por el uso que hace.
Resumen de licencia - Texto completo de la licencia
